

DELIVERED THROUGH THE
EXPERT ADVISORY CALL-DOWN SERVICE (EACDS) LOT B:

STRENGTHENING RESILIENCE AND RESPONSE TO CRISES

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**AIRBEL
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DESIGNING & TESTING SOLUTIONS IN CRISES



CASE STUDY: BANGLADESH RESOURCE FOR INNOVATION LAB

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EXPERT ADVISORY CALL DOWN SERVICE – LOT B

STRENGTHENING RESILIENCE AND RESPONSE TO CRISES

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1 INTRODUCTION




Figure 1 Map of UNHCR Operations in Bangladesh¹

1.1 BRIEF OVERVIEW OF CONTEXT

From 25 August 2015, targeted violence against Rohingya communities in Rakhine State, Myanmar, has forced a massive exodus Bangladesh, in what has been one of the fastest growing refugee crises in the world, and creating the largest refugee camp in the world. The population in the area of Cox's Bazaar grew by 30% - from 2.3 million to 3 million with the new arrivals.²

According to the JRP, responses from the Government of Bangladesh, in partnership with the humanitarian community, have been swift and significant since August 2017. But large gaps in funding remain. In Bangladesh, most Rohingya are effectively stateless, without formal refugee status, adequate humanitarian assistance or protection. At present, they also have little realistic prospect of a formal durable solution (de jure integration, resettlement or repatriation).³


¹ UNHCR Global Focus, Bangladesh

² Martin, W. (2017). "Strategic Recommendations for Shelter Upgrade in Response to the Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis."

³ Wake, C and B. Yu (2018). "The Rohingya Crisis: Making the transition from emergency to longer-term development." ODI Humanitarian Policy Group.

One of the more significant barriers to an effective response has been the policy around NGO registration. The Government of Bangladesh has a lengthy and bureaucratic process in place for NGOs to operate in the camps, which in turn means that NGOs have not been able to implement their plans.⁴ Along similar lines, Save the Children reported barriers to the provision of education in the Cox’s Bazar area in the form of a lack of funding but also obstructive behaviour by the Bangladesh government. The NGO wrote that all of its requests for education permits have been delayed and refused by the Bangladesh NGO Affairs Bureau as INGOs are not allowed to deliver formal education for Rohingya refugee children.⁵ Rohingya in Bangladesh are not allowed to integrate into the labour market except in very nominal terms (e.g. through selling firewood).

Figure 2 Timeline of 2017 Humanitarian Crisis⁶



In January 2018, the governments of Myanmar and Bangladesh reached an agreement to repatriate 156,000 Rohingya over the following two years. However, discussions regarding repatriation – which under international law must be voluntary, and should take place under conditions of safety and dignity – are premature. While Myanmar says that it is willing to repatriate refugees as per the agreement, the government has stipulated that refugees who want to return must produce identity documents (which few have). Given the Myanmar government’s wholly inadequate response to the crisis, and pressing concerns around justice, rights, access and proposed conditions upon return, voluntary repatriation is implausible. While some Rohingya refugees have said they would be willing to return if their safety, security, rights and citizenship were guaranteed, many refuse repatriation under current circumstances.

1.1.1 Time Series Data on Number of Refugees

The following graphs show 1) time series data on the number of refugees in Bangladesh mapped against returnees; and 2) the number of refugees as a percentage of the total population of Bangladesh. The data reflects the significant upsurge in 2017 with the recent crisis.

This is followed by data on trends in reported funding.

⁴ UK House of Commons, International Development Committee (2018). “Bangladesh and Burma: the Rohingya Crisis.” Second Report of Session 2017-19.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Joint Response Plan for Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis, March to December 2018.

Figure 3 Refugees and Returnees in Bangladesh, 1970-2017





Figure 4 Refugees as a Percentage of the Total Population in Bangladesh, 2007-2017



The number of refugees in Bangladesh was expected to rise by another 80,000 starting in March 2018. UNHCR estimates of the growth in the refugee population are presented below. “As of 31 May 2018, there were 23 internally displaced people (IDP) sites in Rakhine State, with a total of 127,953 IDPs.”⁷ There is also the possibility that these IDPs residing in Rakhine State could cross the border into Bangladesh if violence were to break out again.

Figure 5 Predictions for Growth in the Refugee Population⁸



⁷ <https://reliefweb.int/map/myanmar/myanmar-idp-sites-rakhine-state-31-may-2018>

⁸


<https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/JRP%20for%20Rohingya%20Humanitarian%20Crisis%20-%20FOR%20DISTRIBUTION.PDF>

1.1.2 Trends in Reported Funding for Bangladesh

The following figure shows the trend in reported funding for Bangladesh over the last ten years.

It should be noted that this, and all following data unless specifically noted as refugee related, were only available for all humanitarian assistance. Bangladesh did receive humanitarian assistance for floods in 2017/18, though it is expected that the majority of this data is reflective of the refugee crisis.

Figure 6 Trends in Total Reported Funding for all Humanitarian Assistance, 2008-2018, US\$ Billion⁹



1.2 RETROSPECTIVE EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS

This section summarizes available data on historic expenditures related to refugee financing flows, specifically:


- > Who paid for displacement;
- > When did they pay;
- > Who did they pay funds to; and
- > What did they pay for?

1.2.1 Who paid for displacement?

The following figure shows who paid for displacement over the last five years, and demonstrates that the majority of funding came from international government funding sources, with the vast majority coming from bi-lateral governments (classified as "Government" by FTS), while other sources of funding remained relatively small.


⁹ <https://fts.unocha.org/countries/19/summary/2017>

Figure 7 Funding Sources for Humanitarian Assistance in Bangladesh, 2012-2017¹⁰



The top donors in 2017 were the US, UK, EC, Sweden and private donors.

Figure 8 Top Donors, Bangladesh, 2017¹¹




1.2.2 When did they pay?

The graph compares *annual* UNHCR budgets with the total population in need. It's interesting to note that the budgets do seem to correspond with an increase in need, though this is likely to hide potentially significant *intra-annual* variations.

¹⁰ FTS

¹¹ <https://fts.unocha.org/countries/19/summary/2017>


Figure 9 UNHCR Budget Compared with the Refugee Population of Bangladesh, 2012-2017¹²



1.2.3 Who did they pay funds to?

The following table shows the amount of financial support that was channelled through different categories of actors, including Government funds, UN, NGO, Red Cross and the private sector, and demonstrates that the vast majority of funds are directed towards the UN and NGOs.

Figure 10 Destination Organization for Humanitarian Assistance, Bangladesh, 2012-2017¹³



The top five organisations responsible for delivering humanitarian assistance in 2017 were: UN World Food Programme (WFP); International Organizations for Migration (IOM); UNHCR; UNICEF; and Care International.¹⁴

¹² <http://reporting.unhcr.org/financial#tabs-financial-budget> and UNHCR.


¹³ FTS Data

¹⁴ https://fts.unocha.org/countries/19/recipients/2017?order=total_funding&sort=desc

1.2.4 What did they pay for?

The most funded sectors in 2017 were: food security, emergency shelter and NFI, WASH, health and protection.

Figure 11 Humanitarian Assistance by Sector in Bangladesh, 2017¹⁵



¹⁵ <https://fts.unocha.org/countries/19/summary/2017>