

DELIVERED THROUGH THE
EXPERT ADVISORY CALL-DOWN SERVICE (EACDS) LOT B:

STRENGTHENING RESILIENCE AND RESPONSE TO CRISES

PRODUCED FOR



CASE STUDY: JORDAN RESOURCE FOR INNOVATION LAB

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SERVICE IMPLEMENTATION
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EXPERT ADVISORY CALL DOWN SERVICE – LOT B

STRENGTHENING RESILIENCE AND RESPONSE TO CRISES

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1 INTRODUCTION




Figure 1 Map of Syrian Refugees in Jordan by Locality, December 2017¹

1.1 BRIEF OVERVIEW OF CONTEXT

Jordan is one of the countries most affected by the Syria crisis, with the second highest share of refugees compared to its population in the world, with 89 refugees per 1,000 inhabitants.² Jordan hosts over 1.2 million Syrians, of which 650k are officially registered as refugees. Jordan has also historically hosted a large number of Palestinian refugees. The massive influx has overwhelmed Jordan's finances, increasing government expenditures on subsidies, public services, and security.

In its ongoing efforts to further improve its holistic response to the impact of the Syria Crisis, Jordan took yet another pioneering initiative by signing the Jordan Compact during the 2016 'Supporting Syria and the Region' conference in London. Through the Jordan Compact, the government sought to transform the refugee crisis into a development opportunity that attracts new investments and opens up the EU market with simplified rules of origin, thus creating jobs for both Jordanians and Syrian refugees in a complimentary, non-competitive manner.³ The Jordan Compact is discussed in more detail below.

The Government of Jordan has taken a proactive role in seeking to respond to the impact of the Syria crisis. The Jordan Response Plan (JRP) 2017–19 is a three-year plan that seeks to address the needs and vulnerabilities of Syrian refugees and Jordanian people, communities and institutions affected by the crisis. It incorporates refugee and resilience responses into one comprehensive vulnerability assessment and one single plan for each sector, thereby placing the resilience of the people in need and of the national systems at the core of the

¹ UNHCR

² UNHCR February 2018 Factsheet, Jordan

³ The Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis, 2017-2019

response. The JRP represents a paradigm shift by bridging the divide between short-term refugee and longer-term developmental response within a resilience-based comprehensive framework.

1.1.1 Time Series Data on Number of Refugees

The following graphs show 1) time series data on the number of refugees in Jordan mapped against returnees; and 2) the number of refugees as a percentage of the total population of Jordan.

Figure 2 Refugees and Returnees in Jordan, 1990-2017⁴





Figure 3 Refugees as a Percentage of the Total Population in Jordan, 2007-2017



According to UNHCR, it is anticipated that the number of refugees should remain relatively stable. “Despite the fact that the situation in Syria is likely to remain fluid in 2018, including on-going conflict in parts of the country that will continue to generate significant levels of internal displacement, **large-scale new arrivals to the refugee hosting countries are not anticipated in 2018.** This is due to several factors, including that national borders will continue to be managed and that admission policies and practices will remain largely similar to the situation over the past year. At the same time, while political and security developments in Syria during 2018 may continue to result in a reduction of hostilities and relative stability may emerge in some areas of the country, overall conditions for safe, voluntary and dignified return may still not be in place.”⁵ The closing of borders combined with ongoing pressure for returning refugees into Syria will likely prevent any spikes in need.

⁴ UNHCR

⁵<http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/Syria%203RP%20Regional%20Strategic%20Overview%202018-2019%20%28December%202017%29.pdf?v=2>

1.1.2 Trends in Reported Funding for Jordan

The following two figures show the trends in reported funding, as well as the total amount received as a percentage of the amount requested for Jordan over the last ten years.

It should be noted that this, and all following data unless specifically noted as refugee related, were only available for all humanitarian assistance. It is expected, however, that the majority of this data is reflective of the refugee crisis.

The data in Figure 3 was only available for the whole portfolio of humanitarian assistance to Jordan. Given that assistance for other disaster types is expected to be minimal, it is reasonable to assume that this data is highly representative of data for the refugee crisis. The breakdown in Figure 4 was available specifically for refugee flows.

Figure 4 Trends in Total Reported Funding for all Humanitarian Assistance, 2008-2018, US\$ Billion⁶





Figure 5 Trends in Requested vs Funded Amounts for Refugees, 2008-2017⁷



⁶ <https://fts.unocha.org/countries/114/summary/2018>

⁷ FTS

1.2 RETROSPECTIVE EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS


This section summarizes available data on historic expenditures related to refugee financing flows, specifically:

- > Who paid for displacement;
- > When did they pay;
- > Who did they pay funds to; and
- > What did they pay for?

1.2.1 Who paid for displacement?


The following figure shows who paid for displacement over the last five years, and demonstrates that the majority of funding came from international government funding sources, with the vast majority coming from bi-lateral governments (classified as "Government" by FTS), followed by multi-laterals (classified as "Inter-governmental by FTS).

Figure 6 Funding Sources for Humanitarian Assistance in Jordan, 2012-2017⁸



The top donors in 2013 were the US, EC, UK, Kuwait and Germany.

Figure 7 Top Donors in Jordan, 2013⁹




⁸ FTS

⁹ <https://fts.unocha.org/countries/114/summary/2013>

1.2.2 When did they pay?

The graph compares *annual* UNHCR budgets with the total population in need. It's interesting to note that the budgets do seem to correspond with an increase in need, though this is likely to hide potentially significant *intra-annual* variations. There also appears to be a significant tailing off of funds in 2017.


Figure 8 UNHCR Budget Compared with the Refugee Population of Jordan, 2012-2017¹⁰



1.2.3 Who did they pay funds to?

The following table shows the amount of financial support that was channelled through different categories of actors, including Government funds, UN, NGO, Red Cross and the private sector, and demonstrates that the vast majority of funds are directed towards the UN and NGOs, with a very negligible portion targeted to host country government.

Figure 9 Destination Organization for Humanitarian Assistance in Jordan, 2012-2017¹¹



The top five organisations responsible for delivering Humanitarian Assistance in 2013 were: UNHCR, UN World Food Programme (WFP), UNICEF, Government of Jordan and Save the Children.¹²

¹⁰ <http://reporting.unhcr.org/financial#tabs-financial-budget> and UNHCR


¹¹ FTS Data

¹² https://fts.unocha.org/countries/114/recipients/2013?order=total_funding&sort=desc

1.2.4 What did they pay for?

The most funded sectors in 2013 for all humanitarian assistance were multi-sector support, emergency shelter, food security, and health and camp coordination management. Multi-sector support represents close to 84% of the total expenditure. "Multi-sector" refers to projects and activities with no one dominant sector and often applies to UNHCR assistance for refugees.¹³

Figure 10 Humanitarian Assistance by Sector in Jordan, 2013¹⁴



1.3 BUILDING SELF-RELIANCE

Jordan represents one of the most proactive stances to refugee integration and self-reliance. In February 2016, **The Jordan Compact** was agreed, with a specific focus on shifting from short term humanitarian assistance, to a more proactive plan for refugee integration.

1.3.1 The Jordan Compact¹⁵

The Jordan Compact, signed at the high-level London Conference in February 2016, aspires to turn 'the Syrian refugee crisis into a development opportunity' for Jordan by shifting the focus from short-term humanitarian aid to education, growth, investment and job creation, both for Jordanians and for Syrian refugees.

What is the Jordan Compact?

- > Signed in February 2016 at the London Conference hosted by the UK, Germany, Kuwait, Norway and the United Nations.
- > Brings together international humanitarian and development actors under host country leadership.
- > Combines humanitarian and development funding through multi-year grants and concessional loans, with pledges of \$700 million in grants annually for three years and concessional loans of \$1.9 billion.
- > Payment of grants and loans is linked to specific targets.


¹³ FTS Glossary. <https://fts.unocha.org/glossary>

¹⁴ <https://fts.unocha.org/countries/114/summary/2013>

¹⁵ Barbelet, V, J. Hagen-Zanker, D. Mansour-Ille (2018). "The Jordan Compact: Lessons learnt and implications for future refugee compacts." ODI, London.

- > One of these targets is related to formal labour market access. Jordan is to issue 200,000 work permits for Syrian refugees in specified sectors.
- > Commits the EU to relaxing trade regulations to stimulate exports from 18 designated economic zones and industrial areas in Jordan, in return for employment quotas for Syrian refugees in these businesses.
- > Stipulates that Jordan will institute reforms to improve the business and investment environment and formalise Syrian businesses.
- > Commits Jordan to providing school places to all Syrian children, and some vocational training opportunities.

Figure 11 Work Permits Issued across All Sectors, 2016-2017



Under the Jordan Compact, \$12 billion was pledged to help displaced Syrians. The terms included \$1.7 billion in grants over three years to support infrastructure projects; a 10-year exemption from the E.U. rules of origin (a tariff barrier) for producers in Jordan who met an employment quota of Syrian refugees; and a commitment from the government of Jordan to create 200,000 “job opportunities” for Syrians. The \$300 million World Bank Program for Results, signed off in September 2016, tied the release of funds to work permits issued, as well other commitments such as improving the investment climate.¹⁶

1.3.2 The Integrated Urban Shelter Programme¹⁷

In Jordan, the majority of refugees from Syria have settled in impoverished urban areas. Their presence has exacerbated the existing shortage of affordable housing, raising rental prices, increasing social tension and straining urban infrastructure. For refugees living outside of camps, shelter is their most pressing need and rent is the largest monthly expenditure. Some refugees are living in rudimentary shelters or tents, abandoned or partially constructed buildings, or in overcrowded and poorly maintained apartments. These conditions increased the vulnerability of refugees, especially women and girls who were exposed to increased family violence and early marriage (as a solution to leaving the home). Many refugees living in rented accommodation do not have basic tenancy agreements and are vulnerable to eviction and further displacement.

¹⁶ <http://issues.newsdeeply.com/the-compact-experiment>

¹⁷ Ruadel, H and S Morrison-Metois (2017). “Responding to Refugee Crises in Developing Countries: What can we learn from evaluations?” OECD.

One interesting example of an attempt to address these shelter issues come from the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), which developed an innovative programme aimed at responding to refugees' short term shelter needs and building long-term resilience for host communities. The Integrated Urban Shelter Programme, which began in 2013, focuses on poor urban areas with a high refugee density. ECHO, the Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency (Sida); the US Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration; the UK Department for International Development (DFID), Global Affairs Canada and UNHCR provide funding. The programme gives conditional cash grants and technical support to Jordanian property owners to complete unfinished buildings; refugees, selected according to vulnerability criteria, are matched with suitable housing units where they can live in rent free and with a secure lease for a period of 12 to 24 months.

At the end of 2014, the programme brought an additional 4 000 housing units onto the market. It provided adequate shelter and secure tenancy for more than 10 800 Syrian refugees, more than half of them women and girls. With an estimated USD 8 million invested in the local economy, the programme was a direct investment in local communities. The NRC also provides counselling services to refugees living in urban areas, and aims to help people exercise their rights to access essential services, refugee registration and adequate housing. The NRC initially projected that refugee beneficiaries would be able to stabilise their economic situation. But a 2015 evaluation of the NRC programme found that the situation of many refugee households instead is likely to deteriorate once the rent-free period is over, given the Jordanian government's restrictions on refugee employment.

In Lebanon, by contrast, the government has not authorised the establishment of camps for refugees from Syria. The dramatic increase in the number of refugees arriving in Lebanon between 2012 and 2014 added tremendous pressure in the shelter market, and informal refugee settlements spread across the country, most within already low-income communities. The lack of accommodation combined with the rising unemployment and cost of living deepened the vulnerability of refugees and the poorest Lebanese. Shelter conditions are poor, with close to one-third of refugees living in unfinished buildings or in non-residential structures such as garages, shops, warehouses, factories and outbuildings.